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Abstract
The 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act called for a government study of the regulatory
options for on-line Peer-to-Peer lending. On-line P2P sites, most
notably for-profit sites Prosper.com and LendingClub.com, offer
individual “investors” the chance to lend funds to individual
“borrowers.” The sites promise lower interest rates for borrowers
and high rates of return for investors. In addition to the media
attention such sites have generated, they also raise significant
regulatory concerns on both the state and federal level. The
Government Accountability Office report produced in response to
the Dodd–Frank Act failed to make a strong recommendation
between two primary regulatory options—a multi-faceted
regulatory approach in which different federal and state agencies
would exercise authority over different aspects of on-line P2P
lending, or a single-regulator approach, in which a single agency
(most likely the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) would
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be given total regulatory control over on-line P2P lending. After
discussing the origins of on-line P2P lending, its particular risks,
and its place in the broader context of non-commercial lending, this
paper argues in favor of a multi-agency regulatory approach for online P2P that mirrors the approach used to regulate traditional
lending.
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I. Introduction
Like Congress’s prior attempt to legislate a post-bubble repair
and prevention strategy for the American economy, the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley),1 the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank)2 has
received a somewhat chilly response from legal academics.3 As was
the case with Sarbanes–Oxley,4 however, even amid all of the
proposals included for the sake of “doing something” rather than
for strong policy justifications, a few nuggets of genuine value can
be found. One of those, in the case of Dodd–Frank, is the opening
effort to address the regulatory gap surrounding online peer-topeer (P2P) lending. Congress directed the Comptroller General of
the United States and the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) to report on the ideal regulatory structure for this emerging
and rapidly evolving segment of the fringe lending industry.5 The
1. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
Roberta Romano lambasted Sarbanes–Oxley in a now famous article. See
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (arguing that the policies included
in Sarbanes–Oxley “may be . . . characterized as recycled ideas advocated for
quite some time by corporate governance entrepreneurs”).
2. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 11,
12, 15, 18, 20, 22, 26, 28, 31, 42, and 44 U.S.C.).
3. Stephen Bainbridge recently released a paper titled in homage to
Romano’s Sarbanes–Oxley critique. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd–Frank:
Quack Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011). One of
this Article’s authors recently described Dodd–Frank as “at best an incomplete
vision for increasing consumer protection and heightening corporate
responsibility.” Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act: A Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection
and Heightening Corporate Responsibility in International Financial
Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1431 (2011). This Article’s other author
refers to Dodd–Frank as a “missed opportunity” in a forthcoming paper.
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties: Will Dodd–Frank’s New
Whistleblower Law Reform Wall Street?, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
4. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating
Incentives for Sarbanes–Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers,
87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 92 (2007) (calling Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblower protection
provisions “a step in the right direction”).
5. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 989F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1947–48 (2010) (requiring that the
Comptroller General of the United States and the United States Government
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GAO Report, which contains a variety of new information and
insights, was issued on July 7, 2011.6
Online P2P lending is a booming industry7 that has caused
tremendous regulatory confusion, yet it has received scant
attention in legal scholarship. Previous work in the area among
legal scholars has primarily addressed the role of P2P lending in
microfinance for international development.8 Little work has
Accountability Office conduct a study to “determine the optimal Federal
regulatory structure” for person-to-person lending).
6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-613, PERSON-TO-PERSON
LENDING: NEW REGULATORY CHALLENGES COULD EMERGE AS THE INDUSTRY GROWS
(2011) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d11613.pdf.
7. Sheryl Jean, Also on the Loan Menu, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 14,
2010, at D01 (noting that one leading site, LendingClub.com, saw an increase in
loan volume from $16 million in 2008 to $59 million in 2009).
8. See generally Kevin E. Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer-to-Peer Financing
for Development: Regulating the Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
1209 (2010); Raj M. Desai & Homi Kharas, Democratizing Foreign Aid: Online
Philanthropy and International Development Assistance, 42 NYU J. INT’L L. &
POL. 1111 (2010); Molly Buetz Land, Networked Activism, 22 HARV. HUMAN RTS.
J. 205, 219–20 (2009) (discussing the peer-to-peer microlending organization
Kiva); Sarah B. Lawsky, Money for Nothing: Charitable Deductions for
Microfinance Lenders, 61 SMU L. REV. 1525 (2008) (arguing that taxpayers
should be permitted to take a charitable deduction for foregone interest on
interest-free loans through tax-exempt organizations like Kiva). In addition to
the legal scholarship on the microfinance and international aspects of online
P2P lending, an emerging body of work in behavioral economics examines forprofit online P2P sites like those that are the focus of this paper. See Natialiya
Barasinska & Dorothea Schafer, Does Gender Affect Funding Success at the
Peer-to-Peer Credit Markets? Evidence from the Largest German Lending
Platform 1, (DIW Berlin, Discussion Paper No. 1094, 2010), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1738837 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (finding no gender discrimination in
German online P2P lending, contrary to results for US sites) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Seth Berger & Fabian Gleisner, Emergence
of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P
Lending, 2 BUR – BUSINESS RESEARCH 39 (2009), http://www.businessresearch.org/2009/1/finance/1940/berger-gleisner-emergence.pdf (examining role of
groups and paid intermediaries on Prosper.com); Jefferson Duarte et al., Trust
and Credit 4–5 (June 2, 2010) (unpublished paper presented at the American
Finance Association’s 2010 Atlanta Meeting), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1343275 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (finding that
borrowers viewed as untrustworthy are less likely to receive loans on
Prosper.com) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Craig R.
Everett, Group Membership, Relational Banking and Loan Default Risk: the
Case of Online Social Lending 26 (Mar. 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1114428 (last visited Apr. 8,
2012) (finding that membership in a social lending group reduces risk of default
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addressed the proper scope of regulation for domestic for-profit
online P2P lending, other than a forthcoming piece arguing that
online P2P should be completely exempt from securities
regulation9—a position we challenge in this Article.
Like many GAO studies, the online P2P Report is written at a
broad level and avoids specific recommendations.10 Still, it may
on Prosper.com) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Seth
Freedman & Ginger Zhe Jin, Do Social Networks Solve Information Problems
for Peer-to-Peer Lending? Evidence from Prosper.com (Networks, Elec.
Commerce, and Telecomm. Inst., Working Paper No. 08-43, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1304138 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (identifying
information gaps in original Prosper.com lending model) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Michal Herzenstein et al., Strategic Herding
Behavior in Peer-to-Peer Lending (Apr. 27, 2010) http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1596899 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (finding that lenders on Prosper
engage in strategic herding behavior) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Michal Herzenstein et al., Tell Me a Good Story and I May Lend You
My Money: The Role of Narratives in Peer-to-Peer Lending Decisions (May 13,
2010) (unpublished paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1840668 (last visited Apr.
8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mingfeng Lin et al.,
Judging Borrowers by the Company They Keep: Friendship Networks and
Information Asymmetry in Online Peer-to-Peer Lending 29 (July 1, 2011)
(unpublished paper presented at the Western Finance Association’s 2009
Annual Meeting), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1355679 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012)
(finding that the number of online friendships is a signal of credit quality for
borrowers on Prosper.com) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, What’s in a Picture? Evidence of
Discrimination from Prosper.com, 46 J. HUM. RESOURCES 53, 53 (2011) (finding
racial disparities in Prosper.com lending when site formerly used pictures for
borrower profiles). While such work explores a number of interesting questions
and is potentially of great value in crafting narrow regulations relating to P2P
lending, it sheds relatively little light on the threshold regulatory questions
addressed in this paper, such as whether securities regulation should apply to
P2P lending. Moreover, most of this work was based on earlier versions of the
for-profit site Prosper.com, which has since substantially changed its business
model.
9. See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 26), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1823763 (last visited Apr. 8,
2012) (“While it is plausible that P2P notes were either ‘investment contracts’ or
‘notes’ for the purposes of the Securities Acts, there is also a strong case that
they are neither.”).
10. See, e.g., Jeffery M. Johnson & Carl Jensen, The Financing of
Terrorism, 2010 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 103, 109 (noting that the GAO REPORT
on terrorism provides an overview but lacks discussion of specifics); Timothy
Inklebarger, DOL Calls GAO Target Date Fund Recommendations Vague,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.pionline.com/article/2011
0307/PRINTSUB/303079977 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the
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spur some legislative action toward clarifying the regulation of
P2P sites. The Report outlines two possible regulatory schemes:
the continued regulation of the investors in P2P sites by securities
regulators, with regulation of borrowers the responsibility of
various financial services agencies; or unified regulation under a
single agency, such as the new Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB).11 The Report does not provide a recommendation
as between these two options, leaving the future of P2P lending
regulation uncertain. This Article aims to fill the current
regulatory gap and provide a recommended roadmap, as well as
context, for online P2P lending.
Online P2P sites have faced tough scrutiny at the hands of
American securities regulators, both on the state12 and federal
levels.13 Applications by leading platforms to operate in particular
states have been rejected, and the SEC, for a time, prohibited
leading sites from soliciting new lenders.14 Much of the regulatory
uncertainty surrounding how these sites should be classified stems
from what might be described as a “square peg, round hole”
problem. Existing structures for securities regulation have simply
not envisioned an investment opportunity in which the party
seeking financing provides little or no disclosure to potential
sources of capital. Moreover, in a sense, online P2P represents the
perfect securities regulation exam hypothetical, incorporating
thorny and long-puzzling issues such as the definition of a security,
the concept of material review used by some state regulators, and
the meaning of such key identities as issuers, exchanges, and the
like.

Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 42.
12. Brent Hunsberger, Peer-to-Peer Lending: Know the Risks, OREGONIAN (Oct.
4, 2009), http://blog.oregonlive.com/finance/2009/10/peer-to-peer_lending_know_
the.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). For example, LendingClub has no authorization to sell securities in
Oregon, among several other states. Id. Prosper was licensed in Oregon but fined
$15,000 “for selling unregistered securities and not properly disclosing their risks.”
Id.
13. Farhad Manjoo, On this Site, a Stranger Will Spot You Some Cash,
WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2011, at G04 (stating that Prosper.com was shut down for
nine months after the SEC found it had offered unregistered securities).
14. Id.
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This Article recommends neither the “hands-off” approach to
regulating online P2P sites that would flow from the assertion that
they do not sell securities nor prohibition of online P2P lending.
Instead, it argues that online P2P sites should be regulated not by
a single administrative agency but in the same manner as
traditional banking entities. Multiple regulators should oversee
online P2P sites, depending on the particular aspect of online P2P
that falls within an agencies’ regulatory authority. While this
approach may not leave P2P sites free to evolve in an unfettered
hyper-Darwinian fashion, it offers the best chance to protect both
lenders and borrowers from the risks arising as lending goes
digital.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Part II
offers an overview of online P2P lending, discussing the structure
and business model of various sites, the historical and
contemporary context for P2P lending, the importance of P2P
lending’s recent emergence, and the risks these sites pose to users.
Part III analyzes the current regulatory regime for P2P lending,
which is governed on the borrower side by banking law and on the
lender side by federal and state securities law. Part IV discusses
the struggle to create a coherent regulatory regime for P2P
lending, including a study of such lending and various regulatory
options mandated by Dodd–Frank. Finally, Part V recommends
that an organic approach be taken to regulate online P2P lending
in which multiple regulators have oversight and use their
individual expertise from regulating traditional lending to create
and adapt regulation to the evolving world of online P2P lending.
II. An Overview of Online Peer-to-Peer Lending
A. The Basics of Online Peer-to-Peer Lending
In its most general form, online P2P lending can be defined as
any transaction arranged using the Internet in which one or more
individuals lend money to one or more other individuals.
“Traditional” lending, by contrast, involves an institutional lender
such as a commercial bank, credit union, and the like, lending
money to an individual. The cornerstone of P2P lending is that
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individuals, rather than institutions, stand on both sides of the
transaction.
Pure online P2P lending could be structured without a formal
intermediary, with only the communications pipelines of the World
Wide Web facilitating the transaction. For instance, a person
could, legalities aside, post an advertisement on Craigslist
(Craigslist.com) seeking a loan for a particular purpose and
offering a certain interest rate.15 Or a Facebook (Facebook.com)
user could send messages to distant “friends” offering to lend them
money for a specified rate of return.
Of course, while such P2P lending could arise, assuming a
hospitable regulatory environment, the transaction costs
associated with it would be relatively high. The level of fraud and
outright criminality on Craigslist and other “open” web platforms
is incredibly high,16 making it nearly impossible to find legitimate
lending and borrowing partners without extensive additional
investigation of potential counterparts. The Facebook alternative
would be limited in that if one can only reach active participants in
one’s own networks, one has fewer potential partners to reach
(even if a person has more “friends” than a typical law professor).
To capture profits associated with reducing such transaction
costs, online P2P lending sites have emerged. The essential selling
point advanced by P2P sites is the notion that by eliminating the
“middle man”—the commercial bank in a traditional loan—
investors can earn higher returns and borrowers can obtain
financing at lower rates.17 Such sites have been around since 2005
in Europe, where the U.K.’s Zopa was an early leader.18 The most
15. In fact, some would-be borrowers have attempted to do just that. One
posting in the financial services section of the Washington, D.C. Craigslist
sought a “$75,000 loan” to start a new owner-operated trucking company. Loan
Needed/Great Collateral (Westminster), CRAIGSLIST (Dec. 31, 2011, 9:42 AM
EST), http://www.webcitation.org/64QPrGAyR (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See Aleksandra Todorova, A Craigslist Scam You Might Fall For,
SMARTMONEY (Aug. 10, 2005), http://www.smartmoney.com/spend/familymoney/a-craigslist-scam-you-might-fall-for/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (noting
that Craigslist receives 200 scam complaints per month) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). While this number is small compared to the
overall level of traffic on the site, according to its founder “the bad guys are
persistent.” Id.
17. Verstein, supra note 9, at 11.
18. G. Jeffrey MacDonald, Web Sparks Person-to-Person Lending Around
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well-known U.S. versions of such sites are Prosper Marketplace
(Prosper.com) and LendingClub (www.lendingclub.com), which
represent the “heartland of P2P.”19
Prosper and LendingClub are the two most prominent online
P2P sites in the United States, and both now use a similar
business model.20 Prospective borrowers register with the platform
and complete a loan application.21 Investors then review loan
requests and determine which to fund.22 Investors do not make
loans directly to borrowers.23 Once an investor chooses to fund a
loan, a separate bank issues the loan to the borrower and then
sells the loan to the P2P platform.24 The platform then issues a
separate note to the investor with a return on the investment
contingent upon the borrower repaying the original loan.25 Thus,
the investor has made an investment in a note, not an actual loan,
and hopes that the borrower will repay so that the note will be
paid by the platform.
LendingClub charges a fee for its services, and retrading of
notes prior to maturity is permitted via a web-based platform
created by a separate broker–dealer firm.26 The interest rate for a
loan is set by the site according to its analysis of the borrower’s
credit history, income, debt, and other factors.27 All borrowers
must meet certain minimum credit criteria.28 Interest rates vary
between 7% and 21%, and borrowers may request up to $25,000.29
Prosper.com utilizes a similar model. Originally, the site used
an online auction to “find investors willing to make loans to
the World, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 24, 2007, at 13.
19. Verstein, supra note 9, at 6.
20. Id.
21. HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE § 5.03A
(3d ed. 2010 supp.).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Pamela Yip, Person-to-Person Lending Is Networking Its Way Up,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 10, 2007, at 1D.
28. See Jean, supra note 7, at D1 (noting that LendingClub requires
borrowers to have a FICO score of at least 660).
29. Id.
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particular borrowers.”30 The lowest bidders (that is to say, those
investors willing to extend credit at the lowest interest rates)
would “win” the auction, and funds from those bidders would be
pooled to extend loans.31 However, the site modified its approach in
2010, removing from lenders the ability to determine interest
rates; instead, the site sets an interest rate based on its own
analysis of the applicant’s financial history.32 Prosper raised its
minimum FICO score for borrowers from 520 to 640 in an effort to
stem defaults.33
A far more limited alternative is offered by a closed-end
mutual fund, National Retail Fund, operated by Perpetuity, Inc.34
Under this approach, investors diversify across consumer notes via
purchase of mutual fund stakes.35 The consumer notes are based
on loans made by the fund itself; investors can browse profiles of
individual borrowers to see “why they are borrowing funds and
‘how they are doing.’”36 The browsing of profiles is meant to make
the site seem “hip” and connected to social networking, though the
Fund in fact represents a far more traditional investment medium.
A variety of other P2P lending sites also exist or have existed.
Between 2001 and May 2011, at least fourteen companies have
offered online P2P platforms in the United States.37 These sites
have used a variety of models of P2P lending, including one that
created direct links between individual borrowers and individual
lenders without the use of a bank in the process.38 The alternative
sites have been geared toward a variety of different segments of
the lending market, such as small businesses, students, or those
seeking loans to purchase a home.39 To date, none have received
the attention that has been paid, both from a business and a
regulatory sense, to the market leaders, Prosper and LendingClub.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, § 5.03A.
Id.
Manjoo, supra note 13, at G04.
Hunsberger, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 17 n.39.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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On Prosper and LendingClub, typical borrowers are “seeking
fairly small, unsecured loans for consumer purposes—such as
consolidating debts, paying for home repairs, or financing personal,
household, or family purchases.”40 Reviewing the borrowers on
LendingClub, for instance, one of the authors found that the
overwhelming share of the applicants sought debt consolidation
loans.41 However, there were a few miscellaneous loan requests—a
person with a credit score between 714 and 749 sought a $6,000
five-year loan to purchase a Honda VTX 1800 Motorcycle, and a
person with a 679–713 credit score sought $4,000 for an
“engagement loan” to cover wedding expenses.42
B. Historical and Contemporary Context for Peer-to-Peer Lending
P2P lending is nothing new; indeed, non-institutional lending
has long been a part of economic activity around the world. What
is new about the sites discussed in this Article is their online
dimension. Situating P2P lending within the broader context of
noncommercial lending helps reveal both some of the reasons it is
attractive to borrowers (and lenders), as well as some of the special
risks that emerge due to the online nature of the new platforms.
Commercial credit’s cost for borrowers is not simply the
expense associated with the bank as “middle man.” Nontraditional
lending is attractive for some borrowers, even if expensive, for at
least two reasons. The first is its convenience. Take payday
lenders, discussed elsewhere in this symposium issue,43 for
40. Id. at 10.
41. LendingClub Screen Shot (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
42. Id. Both loans had been close to fully funded (89% and 85%
respectively).
43. See Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans Misguided?, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1023 (2012); Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory
Lender”—A Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 893 (2012); William M. Webster, IV, Payday Loan Prohibitions:
Protecting Financially Challenged Consumers or Pushing Them Over the Edge?,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1051 (2012); Richard Hynes, Payday Lending,
Bankruptcy, and Insolvency, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607 (2012); Creola
Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians
from Payday Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649 (2012); Nathalie Martin &
Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between Payday Lenders and Tribes: Are Both
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instance. Though they charge seemingly excessive interest rates,
payday lenders offer convenience when compared to other shortterm loan options.44 Surveys of payday loan customers reveal that
the main value they assign to such options is convenience, with
locations near home or work.45 In addition, commercial lending can
subject potential borrowers to what might be referred to as moral
interrogation. Walking into a bank, individuals with low incomes
or credit defects may feel they are likely to be judged. By
comparison, nontraditional lending can be less embarrassing46 and
may even offer anonymity.47
Person-to-person lending has long been part of the fringe
economy. One need only think of borrowing from loan sharks or
lending gas money to one’s college roommate to realize how
common person-to-person lending actually is. Most people, if not
all, have resorted to some form of person-to-person lending in their
lives.
With that said, P2P lending takes a remarkable variety of
forms, including some that are quite formalized. An examination of
three of these forms demonstrates just how varied person-toperson lending can be. The first is the “rotating credit association,”
“RCA,” or “ROSCA.” The RCA is the “basis for the peer lending
methodology.”48 The Chinese hui, Japanese ko or tanomoshi,
Korean kye, Mexican tanda, and Nigerian esusu are all forms of
this kind of lending.49 In Cantonese-speaking China, they have
been around for perhaps 1,800 years,50 and in this country, they
Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
751 (2012).
44. See Nathalie Martin, 1000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A
Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 596 (2010).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Christopher L. Peterson, Removing the Target: Protecting Military
Service Members and Veterans from Financial Predators, HUM. RIGHTS, Spring
2008, at 8.
48. Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Human Worth as Collateral, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 793,
824 n.154 (2007).
49. Christy Chung Hevener, Fed. Res. Bank of Philadelphia, Alternative
Financial Vehicles: Rotating Savings and Credit Associations at 22 (2006), available
at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/community-development/publications/discussionpapers/discussionpaper-ROSCAs.pdf.
50. Id. at 6.
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remain prevalent among certain immigrant communities. One-half
of California’s Japanese immigrants had participated in some form
of rotating credit association according to a 1960s survey,51 and as
late as the 1980s, more than 80% of Korean immigrants in Los
Angeles had participated in RCAs.52
An RCA is formed upon a “core of participants” who make
“regular contributions to a fund which” are then pooled and “given
to each contributor in rotation.”53 They differ in terms of size,
criteria for membership, manner in which order of payouts are
made, organizational structure, and the sanction for violations, but
they share the essential characteristic of being an informal credit
institution lending small lump sums.54
RCAs rely on social trust to ensure repayment of lent funds.55
Inevitably, some members will default (quitting the RCA before
their “take” has been recouped through periodic payments). This
can produce effective interest rates as high as 30%,56 well above
those charged by commercial lenders (and authorized by usury
laws), even for “zero-interest” RCAs.57 In other RCAs, early
recipients of payouts “bid” for interest rates they are willing to pay
for the privilege of early receipt—and such rates can be as high as
24%.58 These suggest relatively high transaction costs in
comparison to traditional credit. Still, RCAs provide a means to
access credit for those unable to access it due to discrimination,
immigration status, or language barriers. Moreover, RCAs provide
51. Id. at 22.
52. Id.
53. Shirley Ardener, The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit
Associations, 94 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. GR. BRIT. & IR. 201, 201 (1964).
54. Id. at 201–02, 216–17.
55. See Dyal-Chand, supra note 48, at 824 (“In their small, close-knit
communities, borrowers cannot default because doing so would risk
extraordinary shame, social degradation, and even ostracism.”); Lan Cao,
Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 882 (1999).
56. Ivan Light et al., Korean Rotating Credit Associations in Los Angeles, in
IMMIGRANT AND MINORITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE CONTINUOUS REBIRTH OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 171, 179 (John Sibley Butler & George Kozmetsky, eds.)
(2004).
57. In a zero-interest RCA, early recipients of funds do not pay any
additional amount for the privilege of enjoying the time value of money.
58. Kumar Aniket, Self Help Groups: Use of Modified ROSCAs in
Microfinance 22, (Edinburgh School of Economics, Discussion Paper No. 137,
2005), available at www.aniket.co.uk/research/shg.pdf.
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convenience because “like numbers gambling syndicates, RCAs
circumvent the slow, unfriendly, and bureaucratic channels of
banks.”59 Like P2P lending, RCAs stand in an ambiguous legal
position; courts sometimes conflate them with unlicensed
lotteries,60 and practices commonly associated with RCAs, like the
failure to report interest income or interest rates exceeding levels
permitted under usury laws, contribute to a widespread belief that
they are unlawful.61
A second well-established form of P2P lending is a numbers
racket, popular at various points among African-Americans in
Harlem and factory-line workers in Detroit, among others. A
numbers racket depends on the identification of a number, the
appearance of which could be predicted but with values that could
not. For instance, an early numbers racket was based on two
figures released each morning in New York City—the total daily
clearances among a certain group of banks and the Federal
Reserve balance.62 The winning number would combine, for
instance, the second and third digits of the “clearings” figure with
the third digit of the Fed balance.63
A person could “bet” anything from a few pennies to a few
dollars on a number, with odds of winning 1 in 1,000 but payoffs of
600 to 1.64 Langston Hughes called the numbers racket “the
salvation of Harlem, its Medicare, and its Black Draught, its 666,
its little liver pills, its vitamins, its aspirins, and its analgesic balm
combined.”65
59. Light et al., supra note 56, at 172.
60. California law is confused on the issue of the legality of Korean kye, and
at least one judge has found that form of RCA “an illegal lottery and also a form
of security which was being sold without prior permission from the proper
authorities.” Cao, supra note 55, at 909. But see Mi Bong Hong v. Chong Chin
Cha, 979 A.2d 250, 258 (Md. App. 2009) (finding valid contract claims in RCA
dispute); Light et al., supra note 56, at 179 (RCAs are “not unlawful in
themselves”).
61. Light et al., supra note 56, at 179.
62. SHANE WHITE ET AL., PLAYING THE NUMBERS: GAMBLING IN HARLEM
BETWEEN THE WARS 12–13 (2010).
63. If the clearings figure was $589,000,000, and the Fed balance was
$116,000,000, then the “winning” number would be 896.
64. WHITE ET AL., supra note 62, at 13–14.
65. GEORGE EATON SIMPSON & J. MILTON YINGER, RACIAL & CULTURAL
MINORITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 122 (1985).
Blackdraft and 666 were popular laxatives. Id. Hughes’s statement was
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Dismissing a number racket as a form of illegal gambling
would be a mistake; the “whole enterprise” has an “essentially
economic nature.”66 Those running the racket were referred to as
“bankers,” and those who played as “investors.”67 Those who
played did not think of themselves as gamblers; they took the term
“investing” literally.68 Hitting the winning number was not the
equivalent of today’s Powerball lottery, where a winner is set for
life.69 Instead, it would provide a windfall “that allowed debts to be
paid off.”70 Investing a few coins a day made sense, even in the face
of long odds (the expected rate of return being slightly above one
dollar for every two played).71 According to retired NYPD detective
Rufus Shatzberg, the numbers racket was a “financial institution”
that “substituted for mainstream organizations that could not and
would not provide financial services in poor communities.”72 Due to
a “vacuum where there were few banks, credit associations, loan
and realty enterprises, numbers gambling emerged [and] became a
source of capital and, ironically, a means of savings, a device for
personally accumulating some resources.”73
The primary appeal of the numbers game was its convenience.
Numbers “runners” made circuits of their customers, who “thus do
not have to go out of their way to bet.”74 Numbers stations were
“located in newsstands, pool halls, cigar stores, and groceries”—
locations people visited for other reasons on a typical day.75 Even
those with traditional savings accounts found “it convenient to lay
a dollar on a number while at the barber shop rather than risk
making no ‘investment’ at all in the day.”76 The numbers rackets
published in a front page article in the New York Times on March 1, 1971. Id.
66. WHITE ET AL., supra note 62, at 23.
67. Id. at 200.
68. Id. at 223.
69. Id. at 225.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 223–24.
72. RUFUS SHATZBERG & ROBERT J. KELLY, AFRICAN AMERICAN ORGANIZED
CRIME: A SOCIAL HISTORY 71 (1996).
73. Id.
74. Ivan Light, Numbers Gambling Among Blacks: A Financial Institution,
42 AM. SOC. REV. 892, 897 (1977).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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have now “almost completely disappeared” thanks to competition
from government-sanctioned lotteries.77
A third form of noncommercial lending is a hybrid between
P2P and institutional lending. Pawnbroking has been around since
the 1850s or 1860s. A pawnbroker takes personal property from
borrowers as security for cash loans; if the loan is not repaid, the
pawnbroker resells the item held as security.78 One nineteenth
century commentator referred to pawn shops as the “salvation of
the wage-earner in bad times.”79 Since its early days, unlike the
illicit numbers racket or the shadowy rotating credit association,
pawnbroking has been subject to fairly tight regulation.80 A
pawnbroker needs little overhead and administration,81 and the
simple nature of the transaction makes it a rapid way to obtain
credit and minimize transactions costs. Pawnbroking thus provides
“essential access to credit for people experiencing financial shocks
who may have nowhere else to turn.”82
These three examples provide insight into the emergence of
online P2P lending. Like each of these forms of nontraditional
lending, convenience is a primary selling point for online P2P sites.
No physical appearance at a bank is necessary; one can apply for a
loan on a laptop computer while sitting on the couch.
On the other hand, some concerns should arise as a result of
the divergence between online P2P and these other forms of
informal credit. There is no family, cultural or group tie-ins with
online P2P that would enforce repayment, as in the case of RCAs.
There is also no face-to-face interaction, as in the case of

77. Anthony N. Cabot, The Games People Play: Is it Time for a New Legal
Approach to Prize Games?, 4 NEV. L.J. 197, 213 (2003).
78. Andrew Martin Fisher, Banking on the Edge: Towards an Open Ended
Interpretation of Informal Finance in the Third World (Mar. 1994) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, McGill University), available at http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:
80/R/-?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=68088&silo_library=GEN01.
79. Helen Bosanquet, The Burden of Small Debt, 6 THE ECON. J. 212, 213
(1896).
80. Jarret C. Oeltjen, Florida Pawnbroking: An Industry in Transition, 23
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 995, 1018 (1996).
81. F.J.A. Bouman & R. Houtman, Pawnbroking as an Instrument of Rural
Banking in the Third World, 37 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 69, 74 (1988).
82. Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link Between
Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361, 1391 (2011).
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pawnbroking or numbers rackets, which might increase the moral
hazard associated with online P2P lending.
Online P2P transactions also involve a level of “cleanliness,”
thanks to the Internet, that might not be associated with
predecessor forms of informal lending. The seeming sterility of the
transaction might reduce the moral sanction associated with such
lending/borrowing and perhaps increase adverse selection. When a
potential borrower turns to a pawn shop or a payday lender, she
must appear personally and may, whether due to the aesthetic
environment or perceptions of social stigma attached to such
borrowing, rethink the need for a loan. By contrast, an online P2P
loan applicant can submit a request for a loan entirely
electronically. The lack of channeling of potential borrowers might
mean that those who turn to online P2P have not adequately
thought through their need for a loan or the likelihood they will be
able to pay it back.
C. The Emerging Importance of Online Peer-to-Peer Lending
Online P2P lending is hot. The Harvard Business Review
called it a “breakthrough idea for 2009.”83 In 2011, the Wall Street
Journal listed Prosper as one of the top 50 “next big things,”84 and
Lending Club won a “webby” award.85 Two reasons explain this
development, one of a positive nature and one negative. The
positive driving force of P2P’s popularity is the emergence of “Web
2.0” applications on the Internet. The negative driving force was
the near collapse—and certainly significant contraction—of the
U.S. consumer and business credit markets in 2008.
The first force driving online P2P, a positive one, is the
development of Web 2.0 businesses. The term “Web 2.0” was
83. John Sviokla, Forget Citibank—Borrow from Bob, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb.
2009, at 25, available at http://hbr.org/web/tools/2009/01/list-toc.
84. The Next Big Thing 2011: The Top 50 Venture-Funded Companies,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870
3300904576178673309577828.html#project%3DVCRank_20110307%26articleTa
bs%3Dinteractive (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
85. 15th Annual Webby Awards Nominees, WEBBY AWARDS, http://www.
webbyawards.com/webbys/current.php?season=15#webby_entry_banking (last
visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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popularized86 by book publisher Tim O’Reilly to describe a second
generation of Internet offering, “which relies on collective
intelligence and action from the bottom up.”87 First-generation web
activity, or “Web 1.0,” treated users as passive, presenting them
with information but declining to involve them actively in the
generation of web content.88 For users of Web 1.0, the
“characteristic activity was surfing static Internet pages.”89
Web 2.0, by contrast, emphasizes the “architecture of
participation.”90 Web sites have become organic, developing as
users (rather than site planners and developers) express their
preferences. Authoritarian web developers have given way to the
“wisdom-of-the-crowds,”91 in which the “harnessing [of] collective
intelligence”92 is accomplished through the use of new software
tools.
Web 1.0 was EncyclopediaBrittannica.com;93 Web 2.0 is
Wikipedia,94 which relies on the inputs of users to create
encyclopedia entries. Web 1.0 was askjeeves.com; Web 2.0 is
Google,95 which traces the behavior of search engine users to
provide inputs to the site’s algorithms. Web 1.0 was ofoto, where
86. The question of who actually coined the term is more complicated, and,
in expected Web 2.0 fashion, heavily debated among the Technorati. Compare
Dylan Tweney, Tim O’Reilly: Web 2.0 Is About Controlling Data, WIRED (Apr.
13, 2007), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/news/2007/04/timoreilly_0413
(last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (asserting that Tim O’Reilly coined it) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review), with Firoz Ansari, Who Coined the Term
Web 2.0?, FIROZANSARI: BLOG (May 20, 2006), http://www.firozansari.com/2006/
05/20/who-coined-the-term-web-20/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (arguing that
Dermot A. McCormack coined the term in a book published in 2002) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. Jessica Guynn, Tech Guru Challenges Next Generation to Get Serious,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008, at 1.
88. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Torts 2.0, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1582,
1585 (2011).
89. Peter Lunenfeld, Welcome to Web 2.0, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2007, at 11.
90. Steven Levy, Farewell, Web 1.0! We Hardly Knew Ye, NEWSWEEK, Oct.
18, 2004, at 20.
91. Steven Levy, The Future of Reading, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 2007, at 54.
92. Dan Fost, What Exactly Does Web 2.0 Mean? Well . . ., SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Nov. 5, 2006, at F5.
93. Daniel E. Harmon, The “New” Web: Getting a Grip on the Slippery
Concept of Web 1.0, LAWYER’S PC, Jan. 1, 2006, at 1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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individuals could print their photos, while Web 2.0 is the photosharing site Flickr.
Online P2P lending offers the Web 2.0 alternative to Web 1.0
lending platforms such as e-loan, Lending Tree, and the like. On
those sites, potential borrowers are passive. They provide
information to a central website, which in turn offers potential
lenders the chance to finance customers’ loans. Web 2.0 P2P
lending harnesses the collective intelligence of potential lenders, at
least in theory, to identify which borrowers will receive loans.
However, the sites as they exist now do not fully exploit the
potential of Web 2.0 interfaces to harness collective intelligence.
Investors are unable, for instance, to share information or
perspectives on a particular borrower or their request—for
instance, by wiki (is a Honda motorcycle the best choice for an
investor with X credit score?).96 Of course, one should remember
that P2P lending is not a static industry that uses a single model,
and along with the rest of Web 2.0, P2P lending will continue to
morph and evolve.
The second driving force behind the growth in P2P lending has
been the credit market contraction following the financial
instability of 2008. In 2008, liquidity crises at several major
financial institutions led to widespread fears that “credit markets,
and in turn the global economy, would completely seize up, causing
an economic catastrophe unparalleled in modern history.”97 Most
readers are no doubt familiar with the unparalleled federal
bailouts that followed.
In the wake of the crisis, even after the string of bailouts
secured the health of most remaining affected institutions,
consumer credit remained far more difficult to obtain than it had
before. Although the financial crisis had its roots in the high
default risk associated with the subprime mortgage lending
industry, consumer credit constricted across the board. Total
consumer lending fell by 6.10% between January 2009 and March
2010, “accelerating into a contraction the like of which has not
been seen before.”98
96. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
97. Edward J. Estrada, The Immediate and Lasting Impacts of the 2008
Economic Collapse, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1111, 1111 (2011).
98. Epic Consumer Credit Crunch Unfolding, SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 2, 2010)
http://seekingalpha.com/article/191517-epic-consumer-credit-crunch-unfolding
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Lenders tightened guidelines on access to mortgages and
home-equity loans. Particularly for high-risk individuals seeking
unsecured debt-consolidation loans, the result has been difficulty
obtaining access to credit via traditional sources. Even some
students have turned to other sources after being turned away by
traditional sources of student loans.99 This has driven borrowers
toward emerging alternatives, including online P2P lending
sites.100
The pressure from credit market challenges did not solely
affect individual borrowers. Even small businesses have been
forced to seek alternative means to obtain credit, and some have
turned to P2P sites.101 P2P has become one of the “fringe” banking
options that has risen in importance as higher-risk borrowers have
been turned away by increasingly risk-adverse traditional lending
institutions.102
(last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
99. Kelli B. Grant, Loan Web Sites Tapped for College Cash, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 29, 2008, at D6.
100. See Alex Brill, Peer-to-Peer Lending: Innovative Access to Credit and the
Consequences of Dodd–Frank, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Dec. 3, 2010)
http://www.wlf.org/publishing/publication_detail.asp?id=2215 (last visited Apr.
8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
101. See Jean, supra note 7, at D01.
102. While it may have been true that in the early days of online P2P
lending, those turned away from traditional lenders were able to qualify for P2P
loans, it appears to be less the case now that the sites have imposed stricter
eligibility guidelines. These stricter guidelines mean that the sites are no longer
“tak[ing] a chance on many of the people banks turned away.” Daniel Wolfe,
Prosper Model Changes, and So Do Perceptions, AM. BANKER, Nov. 2010, at 1.
The degree to which Prosper and LendingClub rejected high risk borrowers even
led to the emergence of a new site—Loanio—aimed at those with “poor or no
credit profile histories.” Press Release, Loanio.com, Loanio.com Unveils Its Peer
To Peer Lending Platform Today and Offers Subprime, Thin and No Credit
Borrowers, the Opportunity to Get Loans Without Exposing Higher Risks to Its
Lenders (Oct. 1, 2008), http://pilot.us.reuters.com/article/2008/10/01/idUS
176351+01-Oct-2008+PRN20081001 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Loanio was created after borrowers with
poor or no credit scores had “little luck” with the established for-profit P2P sites.
Id. The curious thing about Loanio, of course, is that it represented a fringe
section of a fringe section of the lending market. Not surprisingly, the Loanio
business model was not a winner, and the site shut down in March 2011. Peter
Renton, Loanio Closing Down in Next Two Weeks, SOC. LENDING NETWORK (Mar.
31, 2011), http://www.sociallending.net/news/loanio-closing-down-in-next-twoweeks/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). It had made only seven loans, and all of the borrowers had defaulted. Id.
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P2P lending has also allowed capital to flow to communities
that were underserved by the credit markets even prior to the
retraction of those markets in 2008. Individuals who previously
were mired in debt and for whom payday lending may have
seemed the only option have, thanks to online P2P, been able to
consolidate their loans, pay off debts, and improve their credit
scores.103 P2P lending has allowed capital to flow into economically
depressed communities and created new opportunities for
community development and economic growth.104 Moreover, P2P
lending has not only fueled domestic economic development, it has
also fueled economic development abroad.105 Sites such as Kiva
(www.kiva.com) specialize in lending internationally to support
entrepreneurship and economic growth in developing countries.106
D. The Risks of Peer-to-Peer Lending
Despite the benefits of P2P lending, it also raises substantial
concerns. P2P lending shares all of the risks associated with
traditional “brick and mortar” lending including lending fraud,
identity theft, money laundering, consumer privacy and dataprotection violations, and terrorism financing.107 These risks are
then married to and amplified by the anonymity and ubiquity of
the Internet.
The model for P2P lending used by the major for-profit lending
platforms also has a variety of problematic characteristics. First,
the information supplied by borrowers often is not verified, and
when the information is verified, it often proves inaccurate.108 As a
103. See Aleksandra Todorova, Peer-to-Peer Lending Offers Solution for
Strapped Consumers, SMART MONEY (Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.smartmoney.
com/spend/family-money/peer-to-peer-lending-offers-solution-for-strapped-consumers-2
1978 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
104. See Chaffee, supra note 3, at 1439–40 (reporting on the role of peer-topeer lending in domestic economic development).
105. See Davis & Gelpern, supra note 8 (discussing the use of peer-to-peer
lending to facilitate foreign economic development).
106. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 14–16 (reporting on Kiva’s peer-topeer lending model and its role in foreign economic development).
107. See Chaffee, supra note 3, at 1440.
108. See Ron Lieber, The Gamble of Lending Peer to Peer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2011, at B1 (reporting that LendingClub does not verify the information
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result, lenders using the sites face difficulty determining a
borrower’s actual creditworthiness.109 Second, the credit ratings
assigned by the platforms may not accurately predict how loans
will perform because platforms have a limited amount of historical
loan-performance data.110 Third, the returns on the notes that the
platforms sell to individual lenders are based entirely on
repayment by the individual borrowers and are not secured by any
collateral or guaranteed by any third party.111 Fourth, in the event
of default by the borrowers, lenders are dependent on the P2P
lending platforms and their designees for collecting on the
defaulted loan, which the platforms are notoriously bad at doing.
For example, as of February 2009, Prosper Marketplace had
recovered just over $800,000 of the $39.4 million it had charged off
in default.112 The lenders using such sites have no independent
means of pursuing collection on unpaid loans. Fifth, investments
made by individual lenders are significantly less liquid than many
other forms of investment because many of the loans are for three
to five year terms.113 Moreover, some platforms restrict the sale
and transfer of loans to other individuals, except to lenders on that
particular platform.114 Sixth, a high degree of uncertainty exists as
to what would occur in the event that a platform became
bankrupt.115 Seventh, because models of P2P lending and the
regulatory scheme associated with it continue to evolve, a high
degree of uncertainty exists as to how P2P lending will evolve in
the future.116
Because the commonly used model for P2P lending is riddled
with these risks, P2P lending platforms have had a rocky start.
submitted by borrowers a large portion of the time and when it does verify the
information supplied, the information is often inaccurate).
109. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 22 tbl.1 (providing a list of risks for
lenders that were identified by the major for-profit P2P lending platforms).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Hunsberger, supra note 12.
113. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.
114. Id. at 22 tbl.1.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 56–57 (summarizing regulatory agencies’ comments, most of
which noted the “evolving” nature of the industry and anticipated that
regulation should proceed largely in response to this evolution).
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Sites have experienced high default rates, which “rival or exceed
those of credit-card borrowers at big banks.”117 During Prosper
Marketplace’s first three years of operation, approximately onethird of the loans that it helped originate ended in default, and
investors lost on average 4.95% annually during that time.118 In
addition, as of this writing, neither Prosper Marketplace nor the
LendingClub had yet turned a profit.119
As a result, online P2P lending, which at first appears to be a
“golden goose,” may turn individual lenders into “pigeons.” In
LendingClub’s defense, its prospectus, which exceeds 100 pages,
states: “The Notes [, i.e. loans made via its site], are highly risky
and speculative. Investing in the Notes should be considered only
by persons who can afford the loss of their entire investment.”120
And, in Prosper Marketplace’s defense, its prospectus, which
exceeds 120 pages, includes the same language verbatim.121 Still,
the chance of misapprehension of the risk and improper
investment portfolio diversification by lenders in P2P lending
transactions remains exceedingly high.
As a result, the myriad of benefits of P2P lending are matched
with a myriad of risks for borrowers, lenders, lending platforms,
and society at large. A robust regulatory structure on par with the
regulatory structure used for traditional lending is needed to
mitigate these risks.

117. See Hunsberger, supra note 12.
118. See Lieber, supra note 108.
119. PROSPER MARKETPLACE, INC., 2011 FORM 10-K, at 63, available at
http://marketbrief.com/prosper-marketplace-inc/10k/annual-report/2011/3/30/77
86716/filing?secwatch#item6selectedfindata12310201 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012)
(“We have incurred operating losses since our inception and we anticipate that
we will continue to incur net losses through at least 2011.”); LENDINGCLUB
CORP., PROSPECTUS DATED JUNE 10, 2011, at 23, available at
https://www.lendingclub.com/ extdata/Clean_As_Filed_20110610.pdf (“We have
not been profitable since our inception.”); Hunsberger, supra note 12.
120. LENDINGCLUB CORP., supra note 119, at 70.
121. PROPSER MARKETPLACE, INC., PROSPECTUS DATED JULY 14, 2011, at 47
available at http://www.prosper.com/Downloads/Legal/Prosper_Prospectus_
2011-07-14.pdf.
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III. The Current Regulatory Regime for Online Peer-to-Peer
Lending

The current regulatory structure for online P2P lending
involves multiple overseeing agencies. Responsibility for
regulating such lending potentially falls within the purview of a
wide variety of federal and state regulators, including the new
CFPB, the Federal Trade Commission, the United States
Department of Justice, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, various federal bank regulators, and the state
counterparts of all these entities.122 Two things inhibit the
development of a coherent regulatory regime for online P2P
lending. First, such lending is a relatively new phenomenon that
has only recently attracted public attention, and therefore,
regulators are still trying to puzzle through its implications.
Second, a variety of models exist for P2P lending, and models
continue to be created and evolve, which means that developing a
single coherent regulatory regime for P2P lending will be
extraordinarily difficult.
Because banks are involved in the most prominent model of
P2P lending, such lending is already the subject of significant
regulation. As previously explained, the major P2P lending sites in
the United States, Prosper Marketplace and LendingClub, use a
model in which a bank originates loans to individual borrowers,
and notes are then sold to individual lenders with payment on the
notes being contingent upon repayment of the underlying loan.
Because a bank is involved in the lending process, both companies
admit that a myriad of federal statutes apply directly or indirectly
to their lending activities.123 These statutes include the Bank
Secrecy Act,124 the Electronic Fund Transfer Act,125 the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act,126 the Equal
122. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 3–7 (discussing the myriad of federal
and state regulators that potentially share some responsibility for regulating
P2P lending).
123. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 33 tbl.2 (listing federal lending and
consumer protection laws that officials from LendingClub and Prosper
Marketplace admitted are applicable to P2P lending).
124. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b–31, 1951–59 (2006); 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311–14,
5316–22 (2006).
125. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2006).
126. Id.§§ 7001–7006, 7021, 7031.

REGULATING ONLINE PEER-TO-PEER LENDING

509

Credit Opportunity Act,127 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,128 the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,129 the Federal Trade
the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley
Financial
Commission
Act,130
Modernization Act,131 the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act,132 and
the Truth in Lending Act.133
With that said, federal and state securities regulators have
likely taken the most aggressive action in regulating P2P lending.
All regulators who have confronted the issue agree that the notes
in the prominent model for P2P lending are securities.
A. Federal Securities Regulation and Peer-to-Peer Lending
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission has
taken an aggressive role in regulating P2P lending because the
most commonly used model of such lending involves the offer,
sale, and purchase of securities. On the Prosper and LendingClub
sites, banks issue loans to individual borrowers, and notes are
then sold to individual lenders with payment on the notes being
contingent upon repayment of the underlying loan.134 The notes
that are being offered, sold, and purchased in this model
constitute securities under both the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act)135 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act).136 Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act137 and
127. Id. §§ 1691–1691f.
128. Id. §§ 1681–1681x.
129. Id. §§ 1692–1692p.
130. Id. §§ 41–58.
131. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, and 18 U.S.C.).
132. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–596 (2006).
133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006).
134. See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
136. Id. §§ 78a–78pp.
137. See id. § 77b(a)(1)
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security
future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateraltrust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
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Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act138 provide definitions of a
“security.” Because both sections include within the definition of a
security the terms “investment contracts” and “notes,”139 their
applicability to online P2P lending is identical. Importantly, if the
notes in online P2P transactions are either “investment contracts”
or “notes” under federal securities law, then the notes in P2P
transactions are securities, even if they qualify as only one of the
two classes of securities.140
The notes used in the most common model of P2P lending
constitute securities for purposes of federal securities law because
they are investment contracts. In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,141 the
Supreme Court established the test for identifying an investment
gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on
a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security”,
or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
138. See id. § 78c(a)(10)
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security
future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty
or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered
into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or
in general, any instrument commonly known as a “security”; or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months,
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of
which is likewise limited.
139. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (“The term
‘security’ means any note . . . [or] investment contract.”); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006) (same).
140. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64 (1990) (determining that
both “investment contracts” and “notes” qualify as securities).
141. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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contract under federal securities law.142 In that case, W.J. Howey
Company (Howey) sold tracts of land containing citrus groves to
the public.143 Potential customers were offered both a contract for
the sale of the land and a contract for servicing the citrus groves.144
The service contract was to be performed by Howey-in-the-Hills
Service, Inc. (Howey-in-the-Hills), a corporation with the same
management and ownership as Howey.145 Although the purchasers
of the land contract could arrange for other service companies to
tend their groves, Howey-in-the-Hills serviced approximately 85%
of the land that was sold.146 The service contracts had a ten-year
duration without option of cancellation and gave Howey-in-theHills “full and complete” possession of the land that was being
serviced.147 Howey-in-the-Hills pooled fruit from all of the land
that it serviced and then made an allocation of the net profits to
the land owners, most of whom were not residents of Florida,
where the groves were located.148
The Supreme Court held that Howey and Howey-in-the-Hills
were offering and selling securities under the federal securities
laws because they were offering and selling investment
contracts.149 The Court reached this holding by examining the
definition of a security in Section 2(1)—now 2(a)(1)—of the
Securities Act.150 After noting that the definition includes the term
“investment contract,” the Court explained that the term
“investment contract” is not defined in the federal securities laws,
142. See id. at 298–99 (“[A]n investment contract for purposes of the
Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”).
143. Id. at 295.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 296.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 299–300 (concluding that the “transactions in this case
clearly involve investment contracts” and thus holding that Howey and Howeyin-the-Hills were offering and selling securities).
150. See id. at 297 (“The legal issue in this case turns upon a determination
of whether, under the circumstances, the land sales contract, the warranty deed
and the service contract together constitute an ‘investment contract’ within the
meaning of [section] 2(1).”).
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but that the term was commonly used in many state “blue sky”
laws and broadly construed by state courts prior to the passage of
the Securities Act and Exchange Act.151 The Supreme Court
adopted this broad approach and determined that the test for an
investment contract is “whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others.”152 The Court then found that the
land and service contracts were investment contracts because
Howey and Howey-in-the-Hills were offering and selling the
opportunity to invest money in a common enterprise to grow citrus
fruit that they fully operated and managed.153 The Court also
found it irrelevant that the purchasers of the land could have
found someone else to service the citrus groves, concluding that the
test for a security was still met because Howey and Howey-in-theHills were “offer[ing] the essential ingredients of an investment
contract.”154
The Howey test is usually broken down by courts into three
distinct elements.155 First, a common enterprise must exist that
sufficiently intertwines investors’ interests with those of other
investors and/or the promoters of the investment.156 All courts
have held that horizontal commonality, which exists when a pool of
investors is created whose fortunes are tied to the overall success
of the venture, satisfies the Howey test.157 Some courts have held
that vertical commonality, which focuses on the relationship
between the investor and promoters alone, satisfies the Howey
test.158 Second, for an investment contract to exist, an investor
must also have an expectation of profits based upon the
151. Id. at 298.
152. Id. at 301.
153. See id. at 299 (finding that the “transactions in this case clearly
involve[d] investment contracts” because “[Howey and Howey-in-the-Hills were]
offering an opportunity to contribute money and to share in the profits of a
citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly owned [by them]”).
154. Id. at 301.
155. See MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 28 (Rev. 5th ed. 2009)
(“The Howey analysis applied by the courts in these cases can usually be broken
down into three issues.”).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 36.
158. See id. (noting that courts disagree as to whether “vertical
commonality” is sufficient to meet Howey’s common enterprise requirement).
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investment.159 Third, the expectation of profit must come solely
from the efforts of others.160
The notes in the most commonly used model of P2P lending
constitute investment contracts. First, a common enterprise exists.
Horizontal commonality is likely present in the note-based model
of P2P lending because a pool of investors is created who want to
lend money to a pool of lenders. A counterargument might be that
horizontal commonality does not exist in the note-based model of
P2P lending because such lending is connecting individual lenders
with individual borrowers. However, because investors are paying
fees that support both the bank and P2P lending platform, a court
is likely to hold that horizontal commonality does exist in the notebased model. Moreover, an individual borrower on these sites
receives funds tied to the investment of multiple “lenders,” so each
loan is in a real sense a common enterprise.
Even if horizontal commonality does not exist, vertical
commonality may also meet the common enterprise requirement of
the Howey test.161 Although not all courts allow vertical
commonality to satisfy the Howey test, a strong argument exists
for allowing it in the case of note-based P2P lending because
individual investors are not linked to a single issuer but are linked
to an individual borrower, a bank, and a lending platform through
a P2P lending transaction.
Howey’s second element, the expectation of profits, is also met.
Individuals and entities use for-profit P2P lending sites as a means
of investing money and gaining a return. There is no plausible
argument—at least in the case of for-profit online P2P (as opposed
to microfinance/development P2P)—that a profit element is not
central.
Howey’s third element is also likely satisfied because
investors’ expectation of profits in note-based P2P lending is based
solely on the efforts of others. The investor relies on the individual
borrower to pay the loan and the bank and the P2P lending site to
collect from the borrower, pay the lender, and institute default
proceedings in the event that the borrower fails to pay. Current
159. Id. at 28.
160. Id.
161. See STEINBERG, supra note 155, at 36 (stating that some courts have
determined that vertical commonality alone satisfies the Howey test).
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models of online P2P lending, unlike even the investment at issue
in Howey, provide no alternative to having the sites service the
loan and handle collections. An investor is unable to retain an
alternative agent to collect on an unpaid loan.
Although it seems clear that the Howey test for an investment
contract is satisfied, investments in online P2P sites are also likely
securities under federal law because they qualify as “notes.” In
Reves v. Ernst & Young,162 the Supreme Court established the test
for what constitutes a note within the definition of a security under
federal securities law.163 In that case, the Farmer’s Cooperative of
Arkansas and Oklahoma (the Co-Op) sold promissory notes that
were payable on demand by the holder in order to support its
business operations.164 The notes paid a variable rate of return
that was adjusted monthly to keep it above the rate paid by other
local financial institutions.165 After the Co-Op declared
bankruptcy, the plaintiffs in the case brought a class action
against Arthur Young & Co. (Arthur Young), the predecessor to
Ernst & Young, claiming that Arthur Young had intentionally
ignored generally accepted accounting principles in its outside
audit of the Co-Op to inflate the Co-Op’s assets and net worth.166
As a result, the plaintiffs asserted that Arthur Young had violated
various antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act and Arkansas
state securities law.167 The plaintiffs won a $6.1 million judgment
in the district court, which was reversed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.168
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that
the notes in the case constituted securities under both the
Securities Act and Exchange Act.169 The Court began by examining
Congress’s intent in defining the term “security” under federal
162. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
163. See id. at 64–65 (adopting the “family resemblance test” whereby a note
is presumed to be a security unless it “‘bear[s] a strong family resemblance’ to
an item on the judicially crafted list of exceptions, or [the issuer] convinces the
court to add a new instrument to the list”) (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 58.
165. Id. at 58–59.
166. Id. at 59.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 73.
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securities law.170 The Court noted that Congress “enacted a
definition of ‘security’ sufficiently broad to encompass virtually any
instrument that might be sold as an investment.”171 The Court
then adopted a “family resemblance” test for differentiating
whether a particular note was an investment and covered by
federal securities law or whether a note was commercial in nature
and not covered.172 Application of the “family resemblance” test
begins with a rebuttable presumption that every note is a
security.173 This presumption can be rebutted if the note at issue
bears a resemblance to certain judicially created categories of
instruments that are commonly referred to as “notes” but
nonetheless fall outside the definition of a security under federal
securities laws.174 These judicially created categories of notes that
are exempt from federal securities law include notes that are
delivered in consumer financing, notes that are secured by
mortgages on homes, and notes that evidence loans by commercial
banks for current operations of businesses.175
The Supreme Court also created a list of factors for
determining whether courts should exclude additional categories of
notes from the federal definition of security.176 First, the
motivations of the buyer and seller must be assessed.177 If the
buyer is primarily interested in profit and the seller seeks to raise
capital for business purposes, then the note is likely a security
under federal securities law.178 Second, the plan of distribution of
the instrument must be examined.179 If the plan of distribution
includes the creation of common trading for investment or
speculation, then the note is likely a security.180 Third, the
170. Id. at 60–61.
171. Id. at 61.
172. Id. at 64–65.
173. Id. at 65.
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d
1126, 1138 (2nd Cir. 1976)).
176. See id. at 66–67 (stating four factors to be used in determining whether
a “note” meets the federal definition of a security).
177. Id. at 66.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id. (“[W]e examine the ‘plan of distribution’ of the instrument . . . to
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expectation of the public must be analyzed.181 If the public would
view the note at issue as a security, then the note likely is a
security, even if the realities of the transaction might suggest
otherwise.182 Fourth, the risks created by the note at issue must be
assessed.183 For example, a court will be substantially less likely to
hold that a note is a security if another regulatory regime
significantly reduces the risk.184
The notes in the commonly used model of P2P lending are
securities under the Reves test. The default presumption is that
any note is a security, although this presumption can be rebutted
if the notes fall within certain judicially defined categories of notes
that are not securities.185 The notes in the most commonly used
model of P2P lending are unlikely to fall within any of the
currently existing categories of notes that are exempt from federal
securities law for two reasons. First, online P2P lending has only
gained the attention of the public within the past half decade, and
courts have yet to address whether the notes used in the most
common model of such lending are securities. Second, the notes in
the most common model of P2P lending are investments, while the
notes in the judicially created categories of notes exempt from
federal securities law are all consumer or commercial in nature. A
major distinction between these notes and excluded consumer
notes is that the person providing funds associated with the P2P
note is not also seeking to facilitate the sale of real or personal
property to the borrower.
In addition, courts are unlikely to hold that the notes in the
most common model of P2P lending should be recognized as a new
category of notes that do not constitute securities. All of the factors
for creating new categories of notes that do not constitute
determine whether it is an instrument in which there is ‘common trading for
speculation or investment.’”).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 67 (“Finally, we examine whether some factor such as the
existence of another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the
instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary.”).
184. Id.
185. See id. (“A note is presumed to be a ‘security,’ and that presumption
may be rebutted only by a showing that the note bears a strong resemblance (in
terms of the four factors we have identified) to one of the enumerated categories
of instrument.”).
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securities implicitly ask the same question: Is this note an
investment?186 Although the loans that are made by the bank to
the individual borrowers in the most common model of P2P
lending may not be investments, the securitized loans (i.e., the
notes) that are sold to the individual lender definitely are
investments. Arguing that the notes that are sold in P2P lending
transactions to individual lenders are exempt from federal
securities law would be similar to arguing the mortgage-backed
securities that were at the heart of the most recent financial crisis
are not securities. The concept behind both is the same, and a
court is extraordinarily unlikely to rule that either is exempt from
federal securities law.
Moreover, since the SEC and other regulatory agencies have
deemed these notes securities, administrative deference would also
apply to this issue. On November 24, 2008, the SEC issued a ceaseand-desist order against Prosper Marketplace for selling
unregistered securities.187 The SEC alleged that Prosper
Marketplace had violated Section 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act
by offering and selling securities without either filing an effective
registration statement or having an exemption from
registration.188 The SEC determined that the notes at issue in the
action were securities by applying the Howey test for investment
contracts and the Reves test for notes covered by the Securities Act
and Exchange Act.189 Put another way, the SEC employed an
approach similar to the analysis discussed above.
An even stronger argument that the notes in the most
common model of P2P lending are securities is based upon the fact
that the major for-profit P2P lending platforms have begun
registering the notes that they sell as securities. At the time that
the SEC issued its cease-and-desist order, Prosper Marketplace
had already submitted a settlement offer, which the SEC had

186. See id. at 66–67 (stating four factors to be used to determine whether a
note qualifies as a security).
187. Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist Proceedings against Prosper
Marketplace, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8984, 94 SEC Docket 1913 (Nov.
24, 2008) (cease-and-desist order).
188. Id. at *2.
189. See id. at *4–6 (applying both the Howey investment contract analysis
and the Reves note analysis).
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accepted.190 Although the Order states that Prosper Marketplace
had entered the settlement agreement “without admitting or
denying the findings [in the Order], except as to the Commission’s
jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of [the] proceedings,”191
one can hardly imagine any circumstance under which Prosper
Marketplace would sacrifice the time and expense of registration,
unless it believed the notes that it was offering and selling were
securities subject to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Both
Prosper Marketplace and LendingClub currently register the notes
that they sell to individual lenders as securities.192 Because
Prosper Marketplace and Lending Club have a strong financial
incentive to avoid the costs of registration by finding any valid
argument that the notes are not securities, questioning whether
the notes are subject to federal securities law seems little more
than an academic exercise.
One author, in a forthcoming article, has argued that the SEC
could have decided that the notes sold in the note-based model of
P2P lending should not be deemed securities.193 In The
Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending,194 Andrew Verstein
argues that policy favors exempting P2P from securities regulation
and that “[g]iven P2P’s potentially tremendous benefits, an ideal
regulator would strive to expand and improve the industry.”195
Vernstein’s article is both thoroughly researched and well written.
All of the arguments he makes are plausible and have some
grounding in existing law.
The authors of this piece, however, dispute several aspects of
Verstein’s analysis. First, he begins with the conclusion that online
P2P should be allowed to develop unfettered by securities
regulation.196 Beginning with this policy conclusion weakens his
190. Id. at *1.
191. Id.
192. See Verstein, supra note 9, at 25 (stating that after the SEC’s ceaseand-desist order against Prosper Marketplace that most P2P platforms
registered with the SEC).
193. See id. at 62–67 (arguing that “P2P notes should be removed from the
scope of the Securities Acts”).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 24.
196. See id. at 26 (stating that “SEC regulation of P2P lending was both
unnecessary and harmful”).
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case that existing law could have permitted the SEC to issue a
finding that online P2P instruments are not securities.197 He
chides the SEC for sticking to law in its cease-and-desist order
against Prosper Marketplace for selling unregistered securities
because the SEC “did not offer policy justifications for [its]
positions.”198 The starting point in regulating a new financial
product, however, is what the law says, not what one wishes policy
would be. Although Verstein does make some valid points in his
analysis of the Howey and Reves tests,199 his analysis runs counter
to the conclusions of regulators and the admissions of the industry
that securities are being sold to individual lenders in P2P
transactions.
Verstein does admit that his argument that P2P notes should
be legally exempt from securities law may not be convincing.200 He
ultimately advocates that P2P notes should be exempt from the
federal securities acts.201
As the GAO pointed out in its report, however, even if a new
Congressional enactment excluded online P2P from the scope of
federal securities regulation, state regulators could still decide the
sites offered securities under state law.202 The next section
discusses the challenge online P2P has faced in the states, a
regulatory concern Verstein does not engage.
B. State Securities Regulation and Peer-to-Peer Lending
State regulators have also been extremely active in the
regulation of P2P lending. States have taken three basic
approaches to regulating P2P sites. First, some states have
prohibited online P2P sites from soliciting “investors” (lenders) in
their states. Other states have allowed the sites to operate within
197. See id. at 27–34 (arguing that the SEC overreached when determining
that online P2P instruments qualified as investment contracts or notes).
198. Id. at 25.
199. See id. at 27–34 (analyzing the online P2P instruments under the
Howey and Reves tests).
200. See id. at 26 (stating that “it is plausible that P2P notes were either
‘investment contracts’ or ‘notes’ for the purposes of the Securities Acts”).
201. See id. at 62 (“P2P notes should be removed from the scope of the
federal Securities Acts.”).
202. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 44.
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their borders according to the business models provided by those
sites. A third approach has been to authorize such sites but limit
“investment” to sophisticated investors.
1. Prohibiting States
Most of the states that have restricted online P2P lending
have targeted only the “investor” or lender side of the P2P
equation. Currently, twenty-one states ban Prosper.com from
soliciting investors.203 A few states have gone further, prohibiting
both investing and borrowing via the sites.204 LendingClub does
not service borrowers in eight states.205
Rather than discussing each of the states’ approaches, this
section discusses one “representative” prohibiting state to
illuminate the foundation of the prohibition approach. Ohio,
through its Department of Commerce, Division of Securities,
blocked Prosper.com from accepting “investors.” The Chief
Registration Counsel for the Division published a conference
presentation discussing the state’s reasoning.206
Ohio requires “merit review” for securities registrants, in
which the Division of Securities must find that “the business of the
issuer is not fraudulently conducted . . . that the plan of issuance
and sale of the securities . . . would not defraud or deceive.”207
Prosper.com’s registration statement included among identified
“risk factors” the statement: “Information supplied by borrowers
203. Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, and West Virginia. Prosper.com, Legal Compliance, http://www.
prosper.com/legal/compliance.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
204. Borrowing is prohibited in Iowa, Maine, and North Dakota. Id.
205. Those states are Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, and Tennessee. See LENDINGCLUB CORP., PROSPECTUS
DATED JUNE 10, 2011, at 90, available at https://www.lendingclub.com/extdata/
Clean_As_Filed_20110610.pdf.
206. See generally Mark R. Heuerman, Ohio Division of Securities, Peer-toPeer (P2P) Lending and Internet Platforms: Ohio Securities Act Implications,
available at http://com.ohio.gov/secu/docs/Conference2010/MarkHeuermanP2P.
pdf.
207. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.09(G)(2) (West 2012).
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may be inaccurate or intentionally false. Information regarding
income or employment is not verified in the majority of cases.”208
This led the Division to conclude that it was unable to find the
business was not fraudulently conducted as required by Ohio law.
Other issues that led to the Ohio decision include the
possibility that Prosper “itself may fall within the definition of a
dealer by charging a fee for listing the notes on the platform,”209
which would require it to comply with broker–dealer regulations.
The Division also worried that Prosper might be considered an
“exchange,” in which case it would have to comply with the
requirements for an exchange.210
Of course, prohibiting a site from operating within a state may
not stop some enterprising would-be site users from finding a way
on to the site. In the brick-and-mortar world of yesterday’s
securities regulation, regulators knew where to go to stop a
fraudster from bilking investors. Responding to their denial of
access to Ohio residents, the sites could (and may indeed have)
limited access to investing options based on an Ohio Internet
protocol address being associated with the would-be user. But by
208.
209.
210.

Heuerman, supra note 206, at 5.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8–10.
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crossing in to a neighboring state and setting up an account with a
“fake” out-of-state address, a person might be able to evade wellmeaning regulators’ reach.211
2. Authorizing States
Twenty states, and the District of Columbia, authorize both
borrowing and lending via Prosper with no restrictions.212 Twentyeight states authorize investment and borrowing via
LendingClub.213 These states tend to be ones that mirror the SEC’s
approach to securities offerings, which does not involve merit
review but simply requires disclosure.214
3. States Authorizing with Conditions
A third group of six states authorize investing via online P2P
sites but only for sophisticated investors meeting “suitability”215

211. See Forum Post by “HornzUp,” LENDING CLUB PEER-TO-PEER LENDING
THREAD (Jan. 1, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://www.shaggybevo.com/board/
showthread.php/79967-Lending-Club-lt-peer-to-peer-lendinggt?s=1fd327777828
4852e50eebc3fa1f818&p=2378532&viewfull=1#post2378532 (last visited Apr. 8,
2012) (“I created an account, with a fictional out of state address. No errors in
account creation and I am getting emails asking me to go through with the set
up and move money over from my checking account.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
212. Those states are Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming,
and the District of Columbia. Legal Compliance, supra note 203.
213. Peter Renton, Which States Are Open to Lending Club and Proper
Investors, SOC. LENDING NETWORK (May 11, 2011), http://www.
sociallending.net/investing-lending/which-states-are-open-to-lending-club-andprosper-investors/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
214. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 28 (noting that more disclosurebased states than merit-based states authorize investment and borrowing via
Prosper and LendingClub).
215. Investor “suitability” describes “the duty of licensed securities dealers
to recommend investment products that are suitable to their clients, in light of
the clients’ investment objectives and financial means.” Michael Bennett,
Complexity and its Discontents: Recurring Legal Concerns with Structured
Products, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 811, 817 (2011).
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requirements.216 In most of these states, Prosper lending is limited
to $250,000-net-worth individuals (excluding home) or individuals
with a $70K income and $70K net worth.217 California imposes less
stringent requirements and does so only for Prosper investors who
put in more than 10% of their net worth (to do so, investors much
have a net worth of $85,000 and an income of $85,000 during the
last tax year or a net worth of $200,000).218 LendingClub is limited
to soliciting loans in Kentucky only for individuals with $200,000
income in the past two years or $1 million in net worth.219
Among the reasons states impose such restrictions are the
financial health of the platforms themselves. States imposing such
restrictions have cited “the risks lenders face, particularly related
to their reliance on the platforms to screen borrowers and service
the loans, the companies’ limited verification of information
supplied by borrowers, and the novelty and untested nature of
person-to-person lending.”220 Both sites have faced concerns about
their profitability; Prosper, which has lost money since its
inception and which, in SEC filings, stated that it might not
“continue as a going concern.”221
IV. Creating a Coherent Regulatory Scheme for Online Peer-to-Peer
Lending
The current regulatory regime for P2P lending is arguably a
paper tiger. As explained in the previous section, under the most
commonly used model for P2P lending, the borrower is protected
by robust banking regulations that are designed to protect that
individual from the bank that originates the loan.222 Lenders are
216. Those states are Idaho, New Hampshire, Virginia, Oregon, and
Washington. Legal Compliance, supra note 203.
217. Hunsberger, supra note 12.
218. Legal Compliance, supra note 203.
219. Supplement to Prospectus Dated July 30, 2009, LENDINGCLUB, available
at https://www.lendingclub.com/extdata/ky_prospectus.pdf.
220. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 29.
221. Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 51 (Nov.
12, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000
141626510000490/p10q9d30d2010.htm#notestofinancialstatementsq32010.
222. See supra notes 124–33 and accompanying text (listing various statutes
that are applicable to the most commonly used model of P2P lending because of
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protected by robust federal and state securities regulation because
notes, i.e., securities, are sold to individual lenders with payment
on the notes being contingent upon repayment of the underlying
loan issued by the bank.223 If a P2P lending platform wanted to
remove itself from this robust regulatory regime, the answer is
simple: Remove the bank. For example, a platform could avoid
having to comply with banking laws and securities regulation
simply by providing a service that connects individual lenders to
individual borrowers for a fee. Providing such connections between
individuals interested in borrowing and individuals willing to lend
is a valuable service, even if a platform provides nothing else.224
If a P2P lending platform opted to provide a service that
connected individual lenders to individual borrowers, although
some additional laws might apply, such a model of P2P lending
would be chiefly regulated by civil and criminal antifraud laws. On
the federal level, for example, the United States Department of
Justice would likely take a leading role in regulating P2P lending
through the use of the federal mail fraud225 and wire fraud226
statutes and through the use of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act227 (RICO), under which mail fraud and
wire fraud are predicate crimes.228 Under this type of model, a
robust and narrowly tailored system of regulation would be
replaced by a thin and loosely tailored system of regulation. In
addition, under such a model, most of the mandated ex ante
disclosure of information that is required under the current
commonly used model would be foregone in favor of ex post relief
from wrongdoing under civil and criminal antifraud laws.
Because models of P2P lending can vary so drastically,
creating a new coherent regulatory regime for such lending will be
extraordinarily difficult. Congress has shown some interest in
the involvement of banks in the lending process).
223. See supra Part III (discussing the application of federal and state
securities law to the most commonly used model of P2P lending).
224. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text (discussing valuable
service that P2P lending sites provide by connecting individual borrowers with
individual lenders).
225. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
226. Id. § 1343.
227. Id. §§ 1961–1968.
228. Id. § 1961.
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modifying the existing regulatory regime for P2P lending, but
Congress may take a substantial amount of time before it
addresses the issue. Ultimately, Congress should adopt an
approach that allows P2P lenders to be regulated in a similar
manner as traditional banking entities. Multiple regulators should
have oversight over P2P lending with each regulator being
empowered to regulate the specific aspects of P2P lending that fall
within its purview and areas of expertise. Such an approach would
allow the regulatory regime to grow organically as P2P lending
continues to morph and evolve.
A. Peer-to-Peer Lending and the Dodd–Frank Act
Section 989F of the Dodd–Frank Act mandated that the
Comptroller General of the United States and the United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct a study to
“determine the optimal Federal regulatory structure” for P2P
lending.229 In conducting the study, the Comptroller General and
GAO were required by section 989F to consult with a wide variety
of entities including, “[F]ederal banking agencies, the [United
States Securities and Exchange] Commission, consumer groups,
outside experts, and the person to person lending industry.”230
Congress specifically mandated that the content of the study
include an analysis of:
(A) the regulatory structure as it exists . . . , as determined by
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, with particular
attention to—
(i) the application of the Securities Act of 1933 to person
to person lending platforms;
(ii) the posting of consumer loan information on the
EDGAR database of the Commission; and
(iii) the treatment of privately held person to person
lending platforms as public companies;

229. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 989F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1947 (2010) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. app.
3 § 11).
230. Id. § 989F(a)(2).
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(B) the State and other Federal regulators responsible for the
oversight and regulation of person to person lending markets;
(C) any Federal, State, or local government or private studies of person to
person lending completed or in progress on the date of enactment of this Act;
(D) consumer privacy and data protections, minimum credit
standards, anti-money laundering and risk management in the
regulatory structure . . . , and whether additional or alternative
safeguards are needed; and
(E) the uses of person to person lending.231

Congress also required that the Report analyze “alternative
regulatory options . . . [and] whether the alternative approaches
[would be] effective.”232
Mandating a study represented a compromise between the
United States House of Representatives and the Senate. Prosper
Marketplace had lobbied both the House and the Senate
extensively to make the CFPB the primary regulator of P2P
lending and to exempt P2P lending from securities law.233
Representative Jackie Speier, a Democrat from California,
sponsored a provision in the House version of the financial
regulatory reform bill that would have placed P2P lending under
the supervision of the CFPB and removed it from SEC oversight.234
The Senate refused to pass a similar provision.235 By the time that
the Dodd–Frank Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010,
lawmakers had reached the compromise embodied in Section 989F
of the Act requiring a study.236
Dodd–Frank’s Section 989F offers several lessons. First,
Congress has a genuine interest in creating a coherent system of
regulation for P2P lending. Second, Congress is in need of
231. Id. § 989F(a)(3).
232. Id. § 989F(b)(2).
233. See Silla Brush, Online Lender Lobbies Congress for Industry Consumer
Regulator, THE HILL (June 9, 2010, 6:23 PM), http://thehill.com/business-alobbying/102323-online-lender-lobbies-congress-for-industry-consumer-regulator
(last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (detailing Prosper’s lobbying efforts) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Brill, supra note 100, at 3 (noting that the negotiators reconciling
the House and Senate bills “reached a compromise” before the Act was signed
into law).
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sophisticated information about P2P lending and how to regulate
it. Third, Congress, or at least the Senate, is unwilling to take
radical steps in regulating P2P lending, e.g., assigning the
regulation of such lending to a new and untested CFPB, until more
information is available.
B. The GAO Report on Online Peer-to-Peer Lending
On July 7, 2011, the GAO issued the mandated report.237 The
Report is aptly titled Person-to-Person Lending: New Regulatory
Challenges Could Emerge as the Industry Grows.238 The title
reflects both that P2P lending continues to grow and evolve and
that any regulatory regime will need to continue to grow and
evolve along with it.
The Report is divided into three main sections.239 The first
section details the lending models for the major for-profit
(LendingClub and Prosper Marketplace) and nonprofit (Kiva) P2P
lending platforms operating in the United States.240 The second
section discusses the potential benefits and risks of P2P lending
and the current regulatory regime governing such lending.241
Finally, the third section of the Report discusses options for
regulating P2P lending going forward.242
The first and second sections of the Report are thorough and
well written. This is little surprise considering the access,
resources, and expertise of the Controller General and the
Government Accountability Office. Notably, the drafters of the
Report had extensive access to a wide range of industry
participants and regulators during the drafting process.243
The third main section of the Report, however, is a
disappointment. The Report addresses only two possible models for

237. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 6.
238. Id.
239. See id. at i (Table of Contents).
240. Id. at 7–17.
241. Id. at 18–42.
242. Id. at 42–56.
243. See id. at 60–63 (discussing the objectives, scope, and methodology in
compiling the Report).
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regulating P2P lending, which can be boiled down to the following
single, lengthy sentence:
We identified two primary options for regulating person-toperson lending that differ primarily in their approach to lender
protection: (1) continuing with the current bifurcated federal
system—that is, protecting lenders through securities
regulators and borrowers primarily through financial services
regulators, which will include the newly formed CFPB—or
(2) consolidating borrower and lender protection under a single
federal regulator, such as CFPB.244

The drafters of the Report do provide some additional analysis of
these models in the remainder of the section, but at an
unfortunately high level of abstraction.245
This level of abstraction is in a sense unsurprising given the
current state of the P2P industry. As the drafters of the GAO
Report note, “The continuing evolution and growth of person-toperson lending could give rise to new regulatory concerns or
challenges, making it difficult to predict what the optimal
regulatory structure will be.”246 Although the drafters could have
suggested a variety of radical approaches to regulating P2P
lending, they discussed the two models that offer the most
flexibility and likely the best use of existing expertise. However,
one cannot help but be disappointed that the drafters did not
discuss a wider range of regulatory options.
C. Choosing Among a Myriad of Regulatory Options
A myriad of options exist for regulating P2P lending. Some of
the more radical options include:
• Allowing the Online P2P Lending Industry to Self-Regulate
• Creating an Administrative Agency to Specifically Regulate
P2P Lending
• Regulating P2P Lending Similar to Online Gambling
244. Id. at 42.
245. See id. at 42–56 (providing abstract analysis of both a bifurcated and a
consolidated regulatory regime).
246. Id. at 54.
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• Developing a Harmonized International System of P2P
Lending Regulation
• Creating an International Entity to Regulate P2P
Lending247
All of these options would likely prove too radical for an industry that
continues to grow and evolve and entails so many diverse models of
lending. Instead, the two options identified in the GAO Report are the
most likely paths forward.
Even among the two choices examined in the GAO Report,
however, placing P2P lending under the purview of a single
regulatory entity, such as the CFPB, would also be a radical step
because it limits the regulatory supervision of the industry, excludes
various regulators from using their specific expertise, increases
concerns about regulatory capture, and creates concerns about
inhibiting the evolution of a growing and changing industry. Prosper
Marketplace may have lobbied the House and Senate extensively to
place P2P lending under the auspices of the CFPB,248 but one has to
wonder about its motives. This is especially true because both Prosper
Marketplace and LendingClub admit that they are selling “highly
risky and speculative” securities.249 Prosper Marketplace wants all
247. One of the authors of this Article has argued extensively for the
international harmonization and centralization of securities regulation. See, e.g.,
Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame: An Evolutionary Model for the
Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Regulation, 79 U.
CIN. L. REV. 587 (2010); Eric C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the Bottom: An
Argument for Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities
Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1581 (2010); Eric C. Chaffee, The
Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United States Government’s
Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187 (2010);
Eric C. Chaffee, Evolution, Not Revolution, in International Securities
Regulation: A Modest Proposal for a Global Securities and Exchange
Commission (forthcoming); Eric C. Chaffee, A Moment of Opportunity:
Reimagining International Securities Regulation in the Shadow of Financial
Crisis, 15 NEXUS 29 (2010). Neither of the authors, however, would argue for
the international harmonization and centralization of P2P lending regulation at
this point. Both authors agree that both the industry and national regulation
need to develop further before international coordination could possibly be
attempted in any meaningful way.
248. See Brush, supra note 233 (detailing Prosper’s lobbying efforts to have
P2P lending regulated solely by the CFPB).
249. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text (containing language
from Prosper Marketplace’s prospectus and LendingClub’s prospectus stating
that the notes that they sell are “highly risky and speculative”).
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the benefits of selling securities without the robust regulatory
protections for investors that come along with it. Frankly, by
involving banks and selling securities in its model of P2P lending,
Prosper Marketplace opted into supervision by both banking and
securities regulators, and it should not be allowed to cry foul because
it does not like the model that it chose. Regulation solely by the CFPB
is defensible if the only or primary concern with online P2P lending is
the protection of would-be borrowers from excessive interest rates or
the extension of credit that they would be unable to repay. But with
online P2P lending, an equally important concern is the protection of
investors, who purchase securities and sink funds in what are likely
risky and dangerous investments. The new CFPB, unlike federal and
state securities regulators, lacks a proven track record of protecting
and educating individuals purchasing securities.
Verstein and others assert that the emerging online P2P
industry is being stifled by overregulation,250 but the industry is
continuing to grow. Perhaps, the industry is not growing as fast as it
might be, but traditionally, underregulated financial services
industries grow quickly until they suffer a dramatic crash.251
This is not to say that the CFPB should play no role in the
regulation of P2P lending. In a multiple regulator model, the CFPB
would obviously be one of the regulators with oversight of the P2P
lending industry. In the event that a pure model of online P2P
lending gains popularity, i.e., one in which platforms connect
individual borrowers to individual lenders for a fee without involving
a bank, the CFPB would likely play a very robust role in regulating
both borrowers and lenders. That type of model, however, is not the
one commonly used in P2P lending today, and the issue of a more
robust role for the CFPB is not ripe for consideration.
250. See Verstein, supra note 9, at 59 (arguing that P2P lenders may be a
“mere victim” of SEC over-regulation).
251. See Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The
Continued Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-Seller
Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 851 (2009) (stating that Congress
promulgated the Securities Act and Exchange Act in the wake of the stock
market crash of 1929 because state securities statutes were “largely ineffective
in preventing fraud”); see also Eric C. Chaffee, Beyond Blue Chip: Issuer
Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Without
the Purchase or Sale of Security, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1135, 1138–40 (2006)
(discussing the rise of federal securities law in the United States in the wake of
the stock market crash of 1929).
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The ideal approach to regulating online P2P lending should be
organic and multifaceted. Multiple regulators should continue to have
oversight and use their individual expertise from regulating
traditional lending and securities investments to create and adapt
regulation to the evolving world of online P2P lending. Such an
approach will allow the regulatory scheme for P2P lending to grow
and evolve along with the industry.
D. The Path Forward
In the short-term, Congress should adopt a wait-and-see
approach to regulating P2P lending. The lending model used by both
Prosper and LendingClub is adequately regulated by existing law.
Individual borrowers are protected by a thick and robust system of
lending regulation,252 and individual lenders are protected by a thick
and robust system of securities law.253 Regulatory agencies should be
given an opportunity to use their expertise to determine how existing
statutes and regulations should be applied to P2P lending and the
opportunity to promulgate new regulations based on their existing
statutory mandates.
Assuming that Prosper and LendingClub continue to be the
dominant players in the P2P industry, and assuming that they
continue to use the same model for P2P lending, Congress may need
to modify existing statutes to better protect the parties in P2P
transactions. With that said, however, P2P lending remains a nascent
industry, and if Congress acts too quickly, it may stifle its ability to
evolve in healthy and useful ways. In the long-term, the CFPB may
be the correct entity to regulate P2P, but it is far too early to decide
this issue. Placing P2P within the purview of any agencies, including
the CFPB, would be a mistake because flexibility is needed to
regulate an industry that continues to morph and reinvent itself.

252. See supra notes 124–33 and accompanying text (discussing some of the
federal lending regulations that are applicable to the model of P2P lending used
by Prosper and LendingClub because of their use of a bank in the P2P lending
process).
253. See supra Part III (discussing the applicability of federal and state
securities regulation to the model of P2P lending used by both Prosper and
LendingClub).
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V. Conclusion

While Section 989F of the Dodd–Frank Act evidences Congress’s
interest in regulating P2P lending, Congress may take a substantial
amount of time to promulgate such regulation. The Dodd–Frank Act
mandates a plethora of studies for purposes of potential future
regulation, and the study required by Section 989F is just one among
dozens mandated to be conducted under the Act.254 Although the
254. See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 123, 124 Stat. 1376, 1412 (2010) (mandating a study
of the effects of size and complexity of financial institutions on capital market
efficiency and economic growth) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5333); id. § 202(f)
(mandating a study of international coordination relating to the bankruptcy
process for financial companies) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382); id. § 215
(mandating a study of secured creditor haircuts) (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5394); id. § 216 (mandating a study of the bankruptcy process for
financial and nonbank financial institutions) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394);
id. § 217 (mandating a study of international coordination relating to the
bankruptcy process for nonbank financial institutions) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5394); id. § 415 (mandating a study of the criteria for accredited
investor status and eligibility to invest in private funds) (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 80b-18c); id. § 416 (mandating a study of a self-regulatory
organization for private funds) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-18c); id. § 417
(mandating a study of short selling) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-18c); id.
§ 526 (mandating a study of the nonadmitted insurance market) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 8205); id. § 603(b)(1) (mandating a study of the treatment of
credit card banks, industrial loan companies, and certain other companies under
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815); id.
§ 620 (mandating a study of bank investment activities) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1851); id. § 750 (mandating a study on oversight of the carbon markets)
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4421); id. § 913 (mandating a study regarding the
obligations of brokers, dealers, and investment advisers) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78o); id. § 914 (mandating a study on enhancing investment adviser
examinations) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1); id. § 917 (mandating a study
regarding financial literacy among investors) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78s);
id. § 918 (mandating a study regarding mutual fund advertising) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78s); id. § 919A (mandating a study of conflicts of interest within
the investment industry) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o); id. § 919B
(mandating a study on improved investor access to information regarding
investment advisers and broker-dealers) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-10);
id. § 919C (mandating a study on financial planners and the use of financial
designations) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-10); id. § 929Y (mandating a
study on the extraterritorial application of private rights of action under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o); id. § 929Z
(mandating a study on securities litigation) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o);
id. § 939C (mandating a study on strengthening credit-rating-agency
independence) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m); id. § 939D (mandating a study
on alternative business models for compensating statistical-rating
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Comptroller General and Government Accountability Office
completed its study of P2P lending on time, Congress may take years
to react to it.
When Congress does ultimately address P2P lending, hopefully it
will take an approach that mirrors traditional lending and allows the
P2P lending industry to continue to evolve. P2P lending is not a static
or fixed concept, and the regulatory regime will need to be able to
grow and evolve along with it.

organizations) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9); id. § 939E (mandating a
study regarding creating an independent professional organization for rating
analysts employed by nationally recognized statistical-rating organizations) (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9); id. § 939F (mandating a study of assigned
credit ratings) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-9); id. § 946 (mandating a study
of the macroeconomic effects of risk-retention requirements relating to assetbacked securities) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77g); id. § 967 (mandating a
study relating to organization reform within the SEC) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78d-4); id. § 968 (mandating a study relating to the “revolving door”
between the SEC and private sector financial institutions) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78d-4); id. § 976 (mandating a study regarding increased disclosure to
investors by issuers of municipal securities) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o);
id. § 977 (mandating a study of the municipal securities markets) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78o); id. § 989 (mandating a study of proprietary trading by
various financial institutions) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1790d); id. § 989F
(mandating a study of person-to-person lending) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. app.
3 § 11); id. § 989I (mandating a study regarding the exemption for smaller
issuers from Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002) (to be codified at
5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5); id. § 1074 (mandating a study on ending the
conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and reforming the housing
finance system) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1757); id. § 1076 (mandating a
study on reverse mortgage transactions) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5602); id.
§ 1078 (mandating a study on credit scores) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5602);
id. § 1406 (mandating a study of shared-appreciation mortgages) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1601); id. § 1446 (mandating a study on default and foreclosure of
home loans) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701x); id. § 1476 (mandating a study
on the effectiveness and impact of various appraisal methods, valuation models
and distributions channels, and on the Home Valuation Code of conduct and the
Appraisal Subcommittee) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2603); id. § 1492
(mandating a study on government efforts to combat mortgage foreclosure
rescue scams and loan-modification fraud) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437f);
id. § 1494 (mandating a study on the effect of the presence of drywall imported
from China during the period beginning with 2004 and ending at the end of
2007 on foreclosures) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-25); id. § 1506
(mandating a study of core deposits and brokered deposits) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78m).

